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Ending the life of the act/omission dispute: causation 




Dr Andrew McGee 
Lecturer, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology. Brisbane. 
 
My aim in this paper is to challenge the increasingly common view in the literature that the law on end 
of life decision making is in disarray and is in need of urgent reform. My argument is that this 
assessment of the law is based on assumptions about the relationship between the identity of the 
defendant and their conduct, and about the nature of causation, which, on examination, prove to be 
indefensible. I then provide a clarification of the relationship between causation and omissions which 
proves that the current legal position does not need modification, at least on the grounds that are 
commonly advanced for the converse view. This enables me, in conclusion, to clarify important 
conceptual and moral differences between withholding, refusing and withdrawing life-sustaining 





It has become something of an orthodoxy in recent times to describe the law on end of 
life decision making in terms which, to an outsider looking in, would seem to indicate 
that something has gone drastically wrong. Although not the first comment, one of the 
most significant remarks in that direction was a comment made by Lord Mustill in the 
course of formulating his judgement in the landmark case of Airedale National Health 
Trust v Bland1 (hereafter Bland). He expressed misgivings about the classification of 
the proposed conduct of the doctors in that case – withdrawing life-sustaining 
measures from Anthony Bland who was in a permanent vegetative state – as an 
                                                 
 Thanks to audiences at the Australasian Association of Bioethics and Health Law Conference 2010, 
University of Adelaide, and at the Clinical Unit in Ethics and Health Law, University of Newcastle, for 
comments on presentations of part of this paper. Thanks also to anonymous referees for useful 
comments. 
1 [1993] AC 789. 
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omission, and famously described the law as ‘both morally and intellectually 
misshapen’,2 a phrase that was to be taken up and not only cited in various articles by 
academics writing in this field but used in the title to some of their papers.3 The 
phrase was used more than once by Lord Mustill himself in that landmark judgement, 
his second use of it making express reference to what he called ‘the moral and 
intellectually dubious distinction between acts and omissions’,4 and it is clear from his 
judgement that the law’s reliance on this distinction is one of the main reasons for his 
sober assessment of what he considered to be the state of the law. Nevertheless, in 
spite of Lord Mustill’s comments, the law has continued to rely on the distinction and, 
since that famous statement was made, there has been an increasingly loud chorus of 
criticism calling for reform and overhaul, with the criticism becoming progressively 
more strident and the language in which it is expressed becoming increasingly 
stronger. Thus it has been said that the Bland decision ‘shrouded the moral issues and 
left the law in disarray’;5 that the law’s continued reliance on the act/omission 
distinction enables judges ‘to smuggle notions of justification in under the guise of 
omissions’;6 that the distinction is ‘used as a cloak for avoiding the moral issues’;7 
                                                 
2 [1993] AC 789, at 887. In this paper the term ‘doctor’ is taken to include any other medical 
practitioner engaging in the relevant conduct. 
3 See for example Keown ‘Restoring Moral and Intellectual Shape to the Law after Bland’ (1997) LQR 
113, at 481, and, more recently, John Coggon ‘Ignoring the Moral and Intellectual Shape of the Law’ 
(2007) 27 LS, at 110. 
4 [1993] AC 789, at 898. 
5 Richard Huxtable Euthanasia, Ethics and the Law: from Conflict to Compromise (Abingdon: 
Routledge-Cavendish, 2007), p 125. The fundamental premise of Huxtable’s book is echoed in the title, 
and it is this premise that I aim to put into question in this paper.  
6 Michael Moore Act and Crime: The Philosophy of Action and its Implication for Criminal Law 
(Oxford University Press, 1993), p 27. 
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that ‘the law is indeed in chaos’8 and ‘confused and contradictory’;9 that ‘our current 
legal regime relies on sophistry’ to distinguish lawful refusal (an omission) from 
assisted suicide (an act)10 and that ‘the “omission” classification is chosen …[to] 
engineer the (morally) right result’.11 These statements echo concerns about the utility 
of the act/omission distinction and its relationship to causality dating from before 
Bland. Thus Ashworth sates that the ‘proper solution is not to warp the concepts of 
omission, duty, knowledge and causation but to provide for…cases to be determined 
on new principles of justification’.12 ‘This’, he says, ‘would require the courts to be 
explicit about the grounds for exonerating doctors or nurses, rather than concealing 
the reasons behind the act/omission distinction’.13 
 
In light of the increasing stridency of these claims, the increasing calls for reform and 
the developments in the debate concerning whether to legalise euthanasia and forms 
of assisted suicide, fresh scrutiny of the claims is warranted. The perceived difficulties 
in the current law are often advanced in these debates as grounds for legalising 
euthanasia, as the only way forward in achieving consistency and clarity in the law. 
For example, Magnusson makes the following statement which seems compelling if 
the assumptions on which it is based are accepted uncritically:  
                                                                                                                                            
7 Andrew Ashworth Principles of Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, 4th edn 2003), p 113. 
8 Richard Huxtable, above n 5, p 117.  
9 Ibid, p 117.  
10 This was the evidence given by Professor Sheila McLean in support of Lord Joffe’s Bill in Assisted 
Dying for the Terminally Ill (HL) 2005: Evidence, at 14. 
11 Richard Huxtable, above n 5, p 120 (italics removed). 
12 Andrew Ashworth ‘The Scope of Liability for Omissions’ (1989) 105 LQR 424, at 437. 
13 Ibid, at 437. 
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In their eagerness to distinguish euthanasia, the Law Lords camouflaged the central issue: 
whether withdrawing life-support and so ending a patient’s life was justified in the 
circumstances. It is better to see the withdrawal of life-preserving treatment for what it is:  a 
form of non-voluntary euthanasia, and to justify it on ethical or policy grounds, than to 
pretend that doctors are not, by withdrawing life-support from an incompetent patient 
dependent upon it, engaged in the killing business.14 
 
However, it will be seen, on examination of the grounds advanced for the claims I 
have identified above, that many of those claims cannot be justified but arise from 
conceptual confusion about the nature of causation and the operation of the 
act/omission distinction, each of which must consequently be clarified. The purpose 
of this paper is to expose those confusions and to provide the requisite clarification. I 
begin by providing an overview of the main lines of criticism of the act/omission 
distinction. I then attempt to expose some of the conceptual confusion that lies behind 
the criticism, and to provide clarification of the categories of act and omission, and of 
the concept of causation as it relates to the application of these categories in the end of 
life context.15 
                                                 
14 Roger Magnusson ‘The Future of the Euthanasia Debate in Australia’ (1996) 20 (4) Melb Univ L 
Rev 1108, at 1118. 
15 There have been other attempts to defend the acts/omission distinction. See, for example, Marc 
Stauch ‘Causal Authorship and the Equality Principle: a Defence of the Acts/Omissions Distinction in 
Euthanasia’ (2000) 26 J Med Ethics 254; Hugh McLachlan ‘The Ethics of Killing and Letting Die: 
Active and Passive Euthanasia (2008) (34) J Med Ethics 636. However, Stauch’s defence focuses 
exclusively on its moral relevance and introduces ethical notions such as his equality principle which, 
in my view, arguably only cloud the distinction in more controversy. Further, as the title of his paper 
implies, he seems to accept that the distinction is merely between different kinds of euthanasia, 
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1. OVERVIEW OF THE MAIN LINES OF CRITICISM 
 
The problems that critics have purported to identify with the act/omission distinction 
centre around four main issues: 
 
1. The first issue concerns whether the conduct engaged in (regardless of 
whether it is withholding or withdrawing) should be considered relevantly 
different if undertaken by a doctor or a layperson or interloper.16 The current 
legal position is that the doctor, in withholding or withdrawing treatment, 
allows the patient to die, whereas a layperson or interloper engaging in the 
same conduct kills the patient. Yet surely – so the objection runs – the doctor 
and interloper do exactly the same thing, perform exactly the same physical 
actions, as each other. The lawfulness of the conduct appears to be dependent 
on the classification of the character of that conduct which, in turn, is 
dependent on the identity or status of the person engaging in the conduct – the 
conduct being classified as letting die if it is engaged in by the doctor but 
                                                                                                                                            
whereas I claim here that omissions, when lawful, are not euthanasia at all. What is required, to defend 
the distinction, is simply a clarification of the concept of omissions and its relationship to causality and 
the existence of accepted moral and legal duties. The question of the moral relevance of the distinction 
between acts and omissions will then take care of itself. McLachlan’s defence consists of denying that 
‘omissions can be causes’. This is mistaken, and his defence will be examined at various points in this 
paper.  
16  This objection has been developed by Dan Brock, ‘Voluntary active euthanasia’ in Beauchamp and 
Walters (eds.) Contemporary Issues in Bioethics (Wadsworth Publishing Co, 5th edn, 1999)  pp 296-
305, and Richard Huxtable, above n 5, p 120. 
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killing if it is engaged in by the layperson or interloper. Yet the social status of 
the defendant should have no bearing on the character of the conduct.  
2. The second issue concerns withholding (rather than withdrawing) treatment. In 
the case of withholding treatment, there is no dispute as to whether or not the 
conduct concerned is an omission. The dispute is whether omissions can have 
causal consequences. In what sense are omissions causative? The current law 
is that, in the case of an omission, causation is only capable of being 
established where there is a duty to provide life-sustaining measures. Lord 
Mustill expressed considerable dissatisfaction with this rule in Bland, pointing 
out that it is more accurate to say that, where there is no duty, the question of 
causation simply does not arise, rather than to say that there is no causal 
agency at all.17 The two issues, he says, are logically independent. Is Lord 
Mustill right to claim that the question whether an omission is causative is 
logically independent of the question of whether a person is under a duty to 
act? We will see that, in fact, these are not logically independent questions at 
all, and that Lord Mustill’s claim is misconceived. 
3. The third issue concerns withdrawing (rather than withholding) life-sustaining 
treatment. The dispute here is whether the conduct is an act or omission. Some 
critics think that the conduct is unquestionably an act because the doctor has to 
do something, namely, withdraw the life-support. In the case of a ventilator, 
for instance, this might seem perspicuous, because the machine has to actually 
                                                 
17 [1993] AC 789, at 895. Lord Mustill’s doubts about the rule are echoed by Thomas J in  Auckland 
Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 235, at 249, where he notes: 
…framing the issue in these terms begs the question: the discontinuance of the ventilator is the 
cause of death if it is not legally acceptable but not the cause of death if it is! 
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be switched off. Opponents of this view can point out that we have to have a 
look at the entire conduct concerned, not just the single act of switching off 
the machine. That conduct merely refuses to provide, from this point forward, 
treatment that was started in the first place, and therefore should be considered 
an omission. If, on the other hand, this is wrong, then it is difficult to see how 
withdrawal can be distinguished from euthanasia, as both would involve acts, 
rather than omissions. A related issue here is whether the law is inconsistent in 
holding withdrawal to be an omission in the case of a doctor but an act in the 
case of an interloper. This issue is of course related to the issue canvassed in 
point 1 above, concerning whether the conduct in question can be classified 
differently by reference to the identity of the person engaging in it, but we 
discuss this version of that objection here because it directly concerns where 
the line is to be drawn between acts and omissions.  
4. A fourth issue concerns whether, even if the conduct had been characterised as 
an act rather than an omission, the conduct would be indistinguishable from 
euthanasia. Does the conception of causation developed here mean that, if 
characterised as an act, the conduct is equivalent to euthanasia? I will argue 
that it does not. But if I am right, does this conclusion nonetheless have the 
consequence that both the interloper and doctor alike merely let the patient 
die? That is the issue we will discuss in Section 2(d). 
 
We will now deal with each of these issues in turn.  
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2. CLARIFYING THE OPERATION OF THE ACT/OMISSION DISTINCTION 
AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THESE CATEGORIES AND THE 
CATEGORY OF CAUSATION 
 
(a) The doctor’s conduct and that of the interloper seem to be identical 
 
Regardless of whether we are dealing with a case of withholding (involving no acts), 
or a case of withdrawal (involving some acts), is the conduct ‘killing’ if undertaken 
by a layperson or interloper, and ‘letting die’ if undertaken by a doctor exercising his 
clinical judgement?18 Surely both layperson/interloper and the doctor ‘do the same 
thing’ in withholding or withdrawing the treatment and the respective identities of the 
persons engaging in the conduct is irrelevant. To develop this objection, Dan Brock 
considers the imaginary case of a competent, terminally ill patient who needs a 
respirator for the rest of her life. She requests to be removed from the respirator by the 
doctors and to be allowed to die. However, she also has a greedy son who mistakenly 
believes his mother will never decide to stop her life-sustaining treatment. Afraid his 
                                                 
18 The killing/letting die distinction is not, of course, the same as the act/omission distinction. First, 
there are many instances of the latter that do not involve any killing or letting die at all – eg, where I 
forget (omit) to put the food back in the fridge. Second, even where killing and letting die are 
concerned, it is possible to argue that one may let die not only by omission, but by certain acts, though 
for reasons we shall see, the law will classify the broader conduct, which may involve acts, as an 
omission. Third, as we shall see, it is possible to kill by omission, and not merely by act. However, in 
many cases, the two distinctions do map onto one another: when withholding treatment, thereby letting 
a patient die, I let the patient die by omission. Further, if the broader classification of omission adopted 
by the courts is accepted, the two distinctions effectively map onto one another, at least where lawful 
conduct is concerned. Therefore, it is important not to make too much of this qualification.  
 9
inheritance will be wasted by long and expensive hospitalisation, he enters his 
mother’s room while she is sedated, removes the life-sustaining measures and she 
dies. When his conduct is discovered, he claims that he did not kill his mother but 
merely let her die. Brock claims that we would dismiss such a claim as a transparent 
sophistry, and believes that we should therefore also dismiss as sophistry the claim 
that the doctors do not kill the patient but merely let them die. If the doctors had been 
able to accede to the mother’s request before the son intervened, they, too, would 
have killed the mother, and not merely let her die, for they each do exactly the same 
thing to the mother. As Brock has expressed the point: 
 
The son performed just the same physical actions, did just the same thing, that the physician 
would have done.19 
 
So how can their conduct be distinguished in any relevant sense?  
 
This seems at first glance to be an extremely powerful objection, and it has recently 
been championed by Bertha Manninen, who expressly endorses Brock’s analysis.20 
Nonetheless, it is mistaken. Consider the following examples. A layperson writes a 
prescription for a friend so that the friend can obtain a sufficiently strong dose of pain 
relieving drugs.  A doctor writes a prescription for a patient so that the patient can 
obtain a sufficiently strong dose of pain relieving drugs. In these cases, from the point 
of view of ‘what they are doing’, it seems as though the doctor and the layperson ‘do 
                                                 
19 Dan Brock, above n 16, p 298. 
20 Bertha Manninen claims that it is an excellent illustration of the difficulty in the law in this area. See 
Bertha Manninen ‘A Case for Justified Non-voluntary Active Euthanasia: Exploring the Ethics of the 
Groningen Protocol’ (2006) 32 J Med Ethics 643, at 646-647. 
 10
exactly the same thing’. But this is not so. Only the doctor actually writes a 
prescription. Even though the layperson’s ‘prescription’ is effective and fools the 
chemist, it does not follow that it is a prescription. It is a forgery. A forged 
prescription is not a prescription, any more than a fake van Gogh is a van Gogh. 
Similarly, a layperson who mistakenly thinks they can witness a signature on a legal 
document when the witness should be a Justice of the Peace or a lawyer, ‘performs 
the same physical actions’ as a Justice of the Peace or lawyer does when witnessing 
the document. It is simply that it does not count as a legally recognised event of 
witnessing.  
 
The apparent forcefulness of Brock’s point stems from a concealed ambiguity in his 
formulation of it which, once exposed, proves fatal to its validity. He states that the 
‘son performed just the same physical actions, did just the same thing, that the 
physician would have done’. But ‘performing the same physical actions’ and ‘doing 
the same thing’ are not identical in meaning. There are many different ‘things’ I can 
‘do’ by performing the same physical actions and so ‘doing the same thing’ does not 
necessarily equate to performing the same physical actions. Whether the physical 
actions two people perform amount to doing the same thing depends on how the 
conduct is to be characterised in the context of its occurrence. In writing a 
‘prescription’, or witnessing a document, I ‘perform the same physical actions’ but I 
clearly do not ‘do the same thing’ in each of these cases as a person qualified to do the 
thing in question. It is worth noting that if Brock, Manninen and Huxtable were right, 
they ought to be criticising the law for inconsistency in the way it applies to these 
examples, too. But nobody criticises the law for inconsistency here. 
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The reason that nobody criticises the law in these cases for being ‘inconsistent’ is that 
what counts as ‘doing the same thing’ is a function of the context, including the 
identity or social status of the participants. And in these examples, it is precisely the 
status of the person that is the important factor, for it is the status of the person that 
determines the lawfulness or the legal validity (as the case may be) of the conduct.21 
Brock, Manninen and Huxtable are therefore quite mistaken in claiming that the status 
of the person should not matter. Though that may be the case in some contexts, there 
are clearly contexts in which it does matter, and there is no reason to doubt that the 
doctor-patient relationship is just such context.  
 
It might be objected that the cases can be distinguished because the witnessing of the 
document is not effective and, if the prescription was not a prescription but a forgery, 
the same cannot be said of withdrawal, for clearly the measures are withdrawn, and 
the patient actually dies. However, this response does not work. For in all these cases, 
the conduct is unlawful or legally ineffective and although, in the case of the witness, 
the layperson’s witnessing of the document is ineffective to result in a correctly 
witnessed document, an incorrectly witnessed document can nevertheless fulfil the 
purpose of a correctly witnessed one if the mistake is not discovered or if it is waived. 
Similarly, a forged prescription can be successful in allowing a person to obtain 
drugs. Legally ineffective or unlawful conduct (as the case may be) can have the 
                                                 
21 Nothing in this view is taken to imply, of course, that there are no contexts in which the doctor is a 
layperson – where, for instance, the doctor is not acting within the scope of his or her employment, as 
that question might need to be determined by a court in certain circumstances, or is otherwise acting 
unlawfully. The objection advanced by Brock and others to the distinction between the greedy son/ 
interloper cases and the doctor cases is that they each ‘do the same thing’ even when the doctor is 
acting lawfully, and it is this claim that I deny.  
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desired effect in the real world. Yet the point remains that although the same physical 
actions are involved, an incorrectly witnessed document differs from a correctly 
witnessed one, and a forged prescription is not a prescription, even if the mistake or 
the forgery is not discovered. Similarly, withholding or withdrawal cannot genuinely 
be characterised as allowing nature to take its course or letting die when conducted by 
Brock’s greedy son or by an interloper, because the greedy son and the interloper are 
not recognised as capable of making that decision as a matter of law. These facts 
impinge on the status of the conduct itself. Indeed, in the case of withdrawal, as Lord 
Goff pointed out, the interloper’s withdrawal constitutes an interference with the life-
prolonging treatment then being given by the doctor and can therefore be regarded as 
actively intervening to stop the doctor from prolonging the patient’s life, meaning that 
it cannot arguably even be characterised as an omission.22 These remarks of Lord 
Goff have been overlooked by critics, and we will return to them in more detail in 
section 2(c).  
 
If the above arguments are sound, it follows that the objection that the characterisation 
and legal status of the conduct should not be made to depend on the identity of the 
person performing it is misconceived. 
 
(b) Why do some omissions have causal consequences but not others? 
 
The objection under this heading is that, supposing that the conduct in question is an 
omission, it is nonetheless wrong to classify the omission in one case as causative but 
                                                 
22 Airedale NHS Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789, at 866. For further analysis of Lord Goff’s suggestion, 
see section 2(c).  
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not in another. Here the example given is not that of the interloper (which involves an 
unauthorised stranger coming into a ward and switching off a life-support machine) or 
the greedy son fearful that his mother will never request the cessation of expensive 
life sustaining measures, but of a layperson refraining from providing nutrition to a 
helpless person. We are therefore concerned with withholding, rather than 
withdrawing, life-sustaining measures, although if withdrawing is classified as an 
omission (see section 2(c)), the issues discussed here will apply to withdrawal as well. 
Withholding life-sustaining measures is uncontroversially classified as an omission, 
and the question here is whether omissions can be said to have any causal 
consequences and, if so, in exactly what sense can they be said to have them. But if 
omissions are causative, it is surely nonsense to hold that only some, but not all, are 
causative. As Lord Mustill put it ‘In common sense, they must all be causative or 
none’.23 This led Lord Mustill to point out, as we have seen, that the question of 
whether a duty exists is logically independent of the question of whether the conduct 
is causative and that, in Bland, contrary to the views of the other Law Lords, the issue 
was not a question of causation, but a question of the existence of a duty: the doctor’s 
omission will be causative (all omissions, rather than merely some omissions, being 
causative for Lord Mustill), but that will not be relevant if there is no duty to provide 
the life-sustaining measures, so the two issues should not be conflated. 
 
Again, the objection seems to be extremely powerful, but it is nonetheless mistaken. 
In order to see this, it is first necessary to clarify exactly in what respect omissions 
can be said to be causative. Once this is clarified, it will indeed be possible to see that 
some omissions are causative and not others. This will then enable us to demonstrate 
                                                 
23 [1993] AC 789, at 895.  
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the logical connection between the causation question and the existence or otherwise 
of a duty.  
 
(I) THE SENSE IN WHICH OMISSIONS CAN BE CONCEIVED AS CAUSATIVE 
 
In what sense are omissions causes?24 If you refrain from acting, how can your failure 
to do anything actually cause anything to happen? You have not done anything, so 
there is no action that could be said to be the cause of anything. Against this, critics 
have argued that not doing something is nevertheless a cause because a failure to act 
is itself an act. James Rachels, for example, makes the following point: 
 
So what is the difference between causing and allowing?...Suppose we say it is the difference 
between action and inaction – when we cause an outcome, we do something, but when we 
merely allow it to happen, we passively stand by and do nothing. This won’t work because, 
when we allow something to happen, we do perform at least one act: the act of allowing it to 
happen….if I allow someone to die, I do not save him, but I do let him die.25 
 
                                                 
24 Some critics have denied that omissions are causes, or have consequences. McLachlan defends such 
a view, criticised by E Gerrard and S Wilkinson in their paper ‘Passive Euthanasia’ (2005) (31) J Med 
Ethics 64, in McLachlan, above n 15, at 637. The mistake in such a view consists of correctly noticing 
that omissions are not causes in the sense in which acts are, but then incorrectly concluding that it 
makes no sense to describe them as causes at all. 
25 James Rachels ‘Killing and Letting Die’ Encyclopaedia of Ethics (London: Routledge, 2nd edn, 2001) 
Vol 2 947, p 949.  
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The difficulty with Rachels’ view – a view shared by other writers in this field26 – is 
that it appears to obliterate the distinction between acting and failing to act, and he 
mistakes the auxiliary form of ‘do’ for an action verb in the last line of the passage 
quoted. ‘Why did you stand by and do nothing?’ is an understandable moral reproach, 
but it is clearly not a different way of asking ‘why did you stand by and do 
something?’27  
 
The source of the confusion in Rachels’ view (aside from being misled into confusing 
the auxiliary form of ‘do’ for an action verb) is a tendency to try to fit the concept of 
causation into one standard paradigm, namely, the paradigm of agents acting on 
things, thereby bringing about a change in the thing acted on.28 I push the door, 
thereby causing it to open when it had been closed. But if I do not push it, does that 
mean that I cause it to be closed? Or do I cause it to remain closed?  What if I am 
with somebody else? Do we both cause it to remain closed with equal force? 
Conceiving of causation exclusively in terms of an agent acting on a thing is 
responsible for generating these puzzles, and leads to a contorted analysis of a host of 
                                                 
26 See also Jonathan Glover, who refers to an omission as ‘a positive act of withholding the medicine’ 
in Causing Death and Saving Lives (London: Penguin, 1977), ch 3. James Rachels’ view was first 
presented in his influential ‘Active and Passive Euthanasia’ (1975) New England Journal of Medicine 
292, at 78-90. John Harris shares the same view: ‘it is natural to think of an omission as something that 
the man does’ Violence and Responsibility (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p 29. This view 
originates with Bentham. But a failure to act is no more a kind of act than is doubt a kind of certainty, 
or ignorance a kind of knowledge.  
27 The absurdity of such a response is made perspicuous if we add the words ‘namely nothing’ after the 
question, as follows: ‘why did you stand by and do something, namely nothing?’ 
28 The following discussion of our concept of causation is indebted to the account of Peter Hacker in 
Human Nature: The Categorial Framework. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2007), ch 3. 
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different cases. For instance, Susan Lowe commits the fallacy when she claims that 
‘one may certainly kill another person by omitting to remove one’s hands from that 
person’s throat’.29 Here the positive act of throttling someone is translated into the 
negative act of omitting to remove one’s hands from their throat. It need hardly be 
pointed out that she has derived her conclusion that omissions can kill (and so be 
causative) simply by thrusting on them a grammar that applies normally only to acts – 
by redescribing the act of throttling as an ‘act’ of failing to stop throttling. 
 
However, as Peter Hacker has recently shown, there are several different paradigms of 
causation, and agent causation is only one, admittedly dominant, type. For example 
we do not merely use ‘cause’ to identify a substance acting to bring about a change in 
another substance, or to describe an event leading to another event, but we use it also 
in an explanatory sense, to make a sequence of events intelligible.30 In this latter 
sense, ‘cause’ does not pick out an agent acting on a thing at all. For instance, we say: 
‘the height of the building caused it to topple’. But the notion of an agent acting on 
the tower is out of place here – the height of the building will not have caused it to 
topple by acting on it31 in the way that a footballer causes the ball to move by kicking 
it. The word ‘cause’ in this example is used to pick out a salient condition that 
explains why the building toppled – that is, to pick out that which, in the 
circumstances and other things being equal, made the difference between its standing 
                                                 
29 Susan Lowe ‘The Right to Refuse Treatment is not a Right to be Killed’ (1997) 23 J Med Ethics 154, 
at 156. 
30 Hacker, above n 28, pp 86-87.  
31 Bede Rundle Why there is Something Rather than Nothing (Oxford University Press, 2004), p 73. 
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and falling.32 In this sense, we use ‘cause’ to mean the reason, out of a number of 
possible candidates, why a particular consequence ensued. 
 
Hart and Honoré have argued that the word ‘cause’ can also be used to pick out the 
absence of a condition that, in the circumstances, and relative to the purpose of the 
inquiry, is the overriding factor that brought about the result, and thereby makes the 
occurrence of that result intelligible. The lack of rain caused the crops to fail. 
Normally it rains and the crops don’t fail. But this year it didn’t rain, and the crops 
failed.33 Similarly, normally, the signalman pulls the lever and the train stops. This 
time, the signalman failed to pull the lever and the train crashed.34 The signalman’s 
failure to pull the lever is the cause of the crash in the sense that it explains why it 
occurred. It is the one feature of the circumstances that is different to that which 
normally occurs, and which explains why the crash occurred. When used in this 
                                                 
32 See Hart and Honoré, Causation in the Law (Oxford: Clarenden Press, 1959), p 32. It has been 
objected that to pick out a condition as a cause in this way is to confuse two separate issues: what the 
cause is, with what strikes us to be the cause (H Kuhse The Sanctity of Life Doctrine in Medicine: a 
Critique (Oxford University Press, 1987), p 56). This is mistaken. In singling out the salient condition, 
we are not committed to the claim that it is the cause because it strikes us as such. Rather, we are 
claiming that, of all the conditions that exist, it was the height of the building that made the difference – 
it wasn’t for instance, any vibrations caused by passing traffic or bad weather. Those conditions also 
exist, but they exist in other cases where other buildings are concerned but do not cause those other 
buildings to topple and, for that reason, are not the cause of the collapse in this case.  
33 Hart and Honoré, above n 32, p 15. 
34 Ibid, p 15. 
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explanatory sense, ‘cause’ is used to mean the reason why something happened. 
Omissions are reasons, and hence causes in this explanatory sense.35   
 
Now the significant point to note is that omissions are only causes in this explanatory 
sense, whereas acts can be causes in this sense but also, of course, under the standard 
paradigm notion of an agent acting on a thing. For example, in the context of human 
conduct, an omission is typically regarded as a cause where blame can be pinned on a 
person for the omission, by reason of there being an expectation that the person would 
have acted, rather than omitted to act. Failure to act explains the occurrence of a 
consequence that would not normally have occurred if the person had acted as 
expected. In this sense, we say that the failure to act caused the consequence. By 
contrast, acts are regarded as having causal consequences regardless of whether those 
consequences warrant attributing blame. If I hit the cue ball onto the red, I cause the 
red to be hit, regardless of whether there’s an expectation I would refrain from 
striking the cue ball onto it or not. But if I do not hit it, it does not follow that I cause 
it to remain stationary on the table regardless of whether there’s an expectation to hit 
it or not. Similarly, in pushing the door, I open it. But it does not follow that if I do 
not push it, I cause it to be closed, or remain closed. If we are looking for an 
explanation of why the door is shut, we typically look for the person who closed it, 
                                                 
35 Hugh McLachlan is therefore mistaken in denying that omissions can genuinely be causative. At one 
point in his paper, the awkwardness of this extreme position becomes apparent, when he is forced to 
concede that ‘omissions can indirectly lead to deaths’ (above n 15, p 637). McLachlan does not explain 
how omissions can lead to, but not cause, deaths. For detailed and incisive criticism of McLachlan’s 
position, see John Coggon ‘On Acts, Omissions, and Responsibility’ 2008 (34) 8 J Med Ethics 576. For 
McLachlan’s response, see his ‘To Kill is Not the Same as to Let Die: a Reply to Coggon’ 2009 (35) 7 
J Med Ethics 456. 
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rather than the multitude of people walking past it and not bothering to open it. It 
would be otherwise if I was a fire warden and there was an expectation on me, as the 
warden, to open a fire-door to allow people through. My failure to open the door 
when it is expected that I would do so explains in this context why it is shut when it 
was expected that it should be open to allow people to escape through it.  
 
This explanatory notion of cause, which ties a failure to do something to an 
expectation that it would otherwise have been done, removes many of the puzzles 
about omissions and causation that have troubled some philosophers. For example, 
Hugh McLachlan has argued that omissions are not causative36 by reference to what I 
would call ‘the infinite possibilities argument’, namely, that one can identify an 
infinite number of possible omissions in any given case:  
 
Some might say that the magnitude of the horrific shooting and killing of students at the 
Virginia Tech in April 2007 was caused by the relative absence of guns on the campus: had 
more guns been present, the murderous student would have been killed before he had fired as 
many bullets as he managed to do. 37  
 
                                                 
36 He claims that they are best characterised as ‘the absence of preventative anti-causes’, of which there 
might be a ‘limitless’ amount. See McLachlan above n 15 at 637. However, for reasons we will see, it 
is not necessary to endorse this obscure and cumbersome characterisation.  
37 McLachlan, above n 15 at 637. McLachlan should, in my opinion, have engaged with the work of 
Hart and Honoré on these issues. We will see below that, although Hart and Honoré’s account of 
causation seems to be out of favour, common criticisms of their account are not cogent.  
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Equally, it might be said, the fatalities were caused by the failure of authorities to 
provide bullet proof vests to the students in case such an event should occur.38 
Because the possibilities can be multiplied endlessly, McLachlan concludes that 
omissions cannot be regarded as causes at all. However, this argument ignores the 
requirement for the putative candidate to do genuine explanatory work in the context. 
To do genuine explanatory work, it is not sufficient to adduce logical possibilities. 
One must adduce real possibilities, that is, possibilities that are genuine in the 
circumstances. This is judged against the usual background conditions that obtain – 
for example, that, normally, school principals are not expected to provide bullet proof 
vests or guns to students with which to protect themselves. In the context of that 
normal absence of any expectation to provide the guns and vests, it cannot be said that 
the possibility of providing the guns and vests – together with the failure to actualise 
that possibility – has any explanatory value. In this sense, failure to provide the guns 
and vests does not explain why the deaths occurred at the school, and so cannot be 
regarded as a cause of the deaths. However, where the context is such that a given 
omission can do genuine explanatory work, omissions can of course be causative.   
 
We therefore use the word ‘cause’ in the explanatory sense to mean the explanation 
for why something happened in the context of our everyday interests and 
expectations, as formed against a background of familiar circumstances. It is relative 
to an expectation in such circumstances that a person should have acted in some way, 
but did not, that we regard that person’s omission to act as explanatorily significant, 
and that we may refer to that omission to act as having caused a consequence. Of 
course this does not rule out the possibility that there can be several explanations for a 
                                                 
38 This example is mine, not McLachlan’s.  
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given consequence, but we are typically interested in the main reason why something 
happened.39 
 
Hart and Honoré, on whose account of causation this account is partly40 based, have 
been criticised on grounds which are pertinent to the difficulties identified by Lord 
Mustill in Bland, and it is therefore necessary to examine that criticism here.  
 
As noted, the explanatory sense of causation indexes what we call a cause to normal 
expectations against a backdrop of familiar circumstances. However, Helga Kuhse has 
claimed that tying causation to what is normally expected of a person in the 
circumstances must be mistaken, by means of the following example.41  Suppose, at 
time t1, it is standard medical practice to provide life-sustaining measures to spina 
bifida patients, including antibiotics, should a patient sustain an infection. Doctor x, at 
t1, decides to withhold treatment from a baby who develops an infection and the baby 
                                                 
39 It is worth noting that there are limited circumstances where an omission has explanatory value even 
though there is no expectation that an agent would have acted in those circumstances. Thus the guest of 
an important host might refrain from advising the host that the host has left the milk out of the fridge 
after making the tea. Here, perhaps because the guest does not want to cause embarrassment to the host 
or adversely affect what may be an important meeting, the guest may refrain from saying anything, and 
we can say that the reason the milk turned sour is that the host left it out of the fridge and the guest did 
not want to say anything for fear of embarrassing the host. But this example does not contradict the 
account given here, for the countervailing circumstances of not wanting to embarrass the host offsets 
the expectation that the agent would otherwise act and in that sense is logically tied up with it, as an 
‘excuse’.   
40 Hart and Honoré do not explicitly connect this notion of cause as used to refer to the absence of a 
condition resulting in a consequence with the use of ‘reason’ in this context as I have done.  
41 See H Kuhse, above n 32, pp 56-58.  
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dies. In this context, on the above notion of causation as an explanation for why the 
baby died, the baby died because doctor x’s conduct deviated from the normal 
practice of providing the treatment in such cases. Doctor x’s conduct made all the 
difference in the circumstances because, normally, doctors at t1 provide life-
sustaining measures and therefore life-saving antibiotics would have been 
administered. Suppose now, however, at t2, standard medical practice is that life-
sustaining measures are withheld if a baby develops an infection. Doctor x withholds 
life sustaining measures at t2. On the explanatory notion of cause, the doctor’s 
conduct is not the cause of the patient’s death at t2 because it is not a feature that 
differs from the conduct of any other doctor in the circumstances at t2. This seems to 
have the absurd result that, on the explanatory notion, doctor x’s conduct is the cause 
at t1 but not at t2. And this is the very result that Lord Mustill’s own objections in 
Bland highlighted; for it seems to mean that some omissions are causes, and some are 
not, and, as Lord Mustill noted, they must all be causes or none of them must be. 
 
The objection is, however, misconceived. On the explanatory conception of causes 
that applies to omissions, we are typically interested in looking for explanations for 
why something happened, the reason it occurred. At t1, the doctor’s conduct is 
identified as the cause in this sense because it occurs in a context where standard 
medical practice, and lawful conduct, requires the life-sustaining measures to be 
provided. In that context, the doctor’s decision not to provide the treatment has 
explanatory power because it deviates from both standard medical practice and lawful 
conduct. The doctor engages in unlawful conduct. By contrast, at t2, standard medical 
practice is to withhold the life-sustaining measures and withholding the life-sustaining 
measures in that context is not unlawful conduct. To regard the conduct of the doctor 
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as causative in this context, unlike in the previous context, has no explanatory power. 
This is particularly so when the purpose of the inquiry is taken into account – after all, 
we do not look for causes in a vacuum, independently of a context for our inquiry. A 
lawyer looking for the cause at t2 will be looking for some other explanation than the 
mere conduct of the doctor if the cause is going to be legally relevant to any questions 
of liability. At t1 by contrast, the doctor’s conduct would have been the relevant 
factor.42 Thus it is the climate in which the cause is looked for that explains why the 
same thing can be considered causative at one stage but not at another. For unlike at 
t1, at t2, withholding life-sustaining measures is no longer, per se, a ground of 
liability. For this reason, it is not explanatorily relevant, given the lawyer’s 
investigative purpose.43  
 
However, for someone who has moral objections to the law having changed, it might 
seem as though the doctor’s conduct is causative, because it does have that 
explanatory power. The doctor could have done something, but stood by and did 
                                                 
42 Notice that it follows from this account that omissions can kill. At time t1, for the reasons given, the 
omission would have been the relevant explanatory factor and, from the point of view of assessing 
liability, would therefore amount to ‘killing’. It is therefore quite mistaken to attempt to defend the 
moral relevance of the act/omission distinction by arguing that acts can be causes but that omissions 
cannot be, as McLachlan does.  
43 It is doubtless true that, in the context in which life is already being artificially prolonged by life-
prolonging measures, it would have explanatory force in some contexts to say that the reason the patient 
died is that the doctor decided no longer to provide any life-sustaining measures, but in the context of 
seeking explanations of legal liability, where the conduct is lawful, such a statement would have no 




nothing. But care must be taken here, for while it doubtless remains true that the 
doctor’s not doing anything to intervene is a necessary condition of the baby’s dying 
when it does, to regard the doctor’s omission as the real explanation for why the baby 
died would be to settle for a partial and superficial analysis. From the objector’s point 
of view, it is really the change in the law and the law itself that is causally 
explanatory. The reason the baby died at t2 is that the law has changed to make it 
lawful to withhold treatment. But for the lawfulness of withholding life sustaining 
measures, the baby would not have died. There is therefore no contradiction in 
holding the doctor’s conduct to be causative at t1 but not at t2. For one question as to 
what is the cause of the baby’s death arises in the legal context, and, in that context, 
the doctor’s conduct is a ground of liability at t1 but not at t2. But another question as 
to what is the cause might arise in either a moral context, or a legal context where 
what is at issue is what the law itself should be. Here, the question of cause is not 
posed in the context of establishing liability. Rather, it is posed in the context of a 
discussion of whether a policy or law should be allowed to continue. In this context, it 
is not so much the conduct of a particular doctor as the law itself – and therefore the 
conduct of all doctors – that is at issue and it is the law itself that can be called 
‘causative’, where that means that the law as it currently stands allows doctors to 
withhold life-sustaining measures thereby letting patients die.44 
                                                 
44 A related criticism of Hart and Honoré, endorsed by Kuhse, has been made by John Harris. Harris 
claims that Hart and Honoré’s account is tied excessively to the notions of standard practice and 
normal conditions, and so cannot explain causation in contexts where what is standard or normal itself 
has disastrous consequences. Harris gives the following example: Every year, just like clock-work, the 
poor and jobless, aged and infirm, suffer terribly and many of them die. What is the cause? The myopic 
view is that they die because they are poor and jobless, aged and infirm. This distinguishes them from 
those who do not suffer or do not die. But the World Moral Authority may identify neglect of other 
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Omissions, then, are not causative in the sense of being consequences of a negative 
act. As we have seen, the very idea of a negative act is nonsense, because it amounts 
to misconceiving inaction as a kind of action and thereby obliterates the distinction 
between acting and failing to act. Much of the confusion in the debate about the 
relevance of omissions stems from this error. Nonetheless, ‘cause’ is a term that is 
used more broadly than simply to pick out an agent acting on a substance, which is 
the paradigmatic notion. It is also used explanatorily, to pick out why, in a given 
context, something that would not normally happen, actually happened. Omissions are 
causative in this limited sense and they are described as having causal consequences 
in a context where the purpose of the inquiry is to find out the reason why the 
                                                                                                                                            
members of society or of the government as the cause, and other features as mere conditions. And 
‘surely the World Moral Authority’s causal explanation is not upset by the discovery that this society 
normally neglects its weakest members’, John Harris, above n 26, p 41. Harris’ criticism is, however, 
based on a misunderstanding. The relevant inquiry, on the Hart and Honoré account, is: is there a 
society where the same neglect of the poor, jobless and infirm occurs, but where the poor, jobless and 
infirm do not die? If there is, then the neglect would be common to both those societies and would, in 
that event, be a mere condition, rather than a cause. However, if there is not, then the neglect can be 
seen as more than a mere condition – it is genuinely causal. Contrary to Harris’ view, the World Moral 
Authority’s explanation is accommodated by the Hart and Honoré account. Hart and Honoré are not 
committed to the view that if something standardly, normally, or always happens, it cannot be a cause. 
Clearly, catching the flu virus standardly or normally causes one to develop the symptoms of flu. 
Rather, they are merely claiming that, in some contexts, it is necessary to look at how the particular 
case contrasts with what normally happens in order to identify the cause – normally the signalman lifts 
the lever and the train does not crash. This time, however, he failed to lift the lever and the train 
crashed.  
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consequence happened, given that, as a matter of course, that consequence would 
never have happened.  
 
It follows from this account that it is by no means the case that a doctor’s omission 
can never be the full causal explanation for why a patient died. In contexts where 
there is an expectation that a patient’s life is to be prolonged because the prolongation 
is only an interim measure, or where the prolongation is, even if ongoing, in the best 
interests of the patient, it is difficult to see how the underlying condition can be a 
complete explanation for why a patient dies. In such a case, the doctor’s omission 
takes on that explanatory role and in this sense, when asked why the patient dies, one 
can legitimately respond by citing the conduct of the doctor – he forgot to reinitiate 
the measures. This means that it is indeed the case, pace Lord Mustill, that omissions 
can be causative in some contexts, but not in others. 
 
(II) THE REASON WHY SOME OMISSIONS ARE CAUSATIVE BUT NOT OTHERS – THE 
LOGICAL INTERCONNECTION BETWEEN CAUSATION AND THE LAWFULNESS OF THE 
CONDUCT 
 
At one point in his judgement, Lord Mustill compares the facts of the case of Bland 
with the facts of Gibbins and Proctor,45 where the appellant, a layperson not a doctor, 
had a helpless person in her care. It was found that the appellant in that case had 
intended to bring about the death of the helpless person by withholding nourishment. 
Lord Mustill remarks as follows: 
 
                                                 
45 R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134. 
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Of course the cases are miles apart from an ethical standpoint, but where is the difference on 
the essential facts?46 
 
We are now in a position to answer this question. We have already seen that the 
identity and status of the person engaging in the conduct can, contrary to what has 
been assumed by some writers, be relevant to the character of the conduct concerned. 
As we have seen, the layperson and the doctor may, in withholding treatment, refrain 
from performing the same physical actions, but it does not follow that, in doing so, 
they are ‘doing the same thing’, that is, ‘allowing the patient to die’. This is already 
one factor that distinguishes the facts of Bland from those of Gibbins and Proctor.47 
But, in addition, the circumstance- and purpose- relative explanatory sense of ‘cause’ 
accounts for why, in one context, the presence or absence of a condition is considered 
to be a cause while, in another context, the same condition or absence of a condition is 
not considered relevant at all. We have seen this with the different cases just 
discussed, of a doctor withholding life sustaining measures at t1, when withholding 
the measures would have been unlawful, and at t2, when withholding the measures 
are lawful. This notion can now be applied to the example mentioned by Lord Mustill, 
and can be used to show why, contrary to his view, the question of whether a duty 
exists is not logically independent of the question of whether the omission is causative 
– the two questions are logically intertwined.48  
                                                 
46 [1993] AC 789, at 893.  
47 R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134. 
48 For this reason, Coggon, in his incisive criticism of McLachlan’s paper (above n 35), is nonetheless 
mistaken to claim that the ‘question is about responsibility, not about omissions’ (at 578). This begs the 
question of causation: we do not normally hold people responsible for things they have not caused. 
True, as argued here, whether an omission is causative will depend on whether there is an expectation 
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Clearly the inability of the helpless person to furnish herself with nourishment, 
together with the intention to bring about that person’s death, explain why she died 
and are, in that sense, the cause of her death, the reason why she died. But this is 
because a layperson caring for that helpless person is regarded as charged with the 
duty of looking after them. Our newborn babies are entirely helpless and completely 
dependent on us. We are expected to provide the nutrition they need, and the law 
imposes a duty on us to do so. If a parent fails to do so and the baby dies, the parent’s 
failure to provide the nutrition explains, from the point of view of establishing any 
liability, why the baby died and, in that sense, is the cause of death at law. Failure to 
provide the necessities of life is the reason for the baby’s death. But in the case of a 
doctor lawfully withholding nutrition from a terminally-ill patient, the doctor’s 
conduct in that climate is not explanatorily relevant. The reason for the patient’s death 
is the fact that it is lawful for the doctor to withhold the treatment. Unlike in the 
Gibbins and Proctor49 case, the doctor was not under a duty to provide the measures, 
and so his not providing the measures is no failure, is not a possible ground of 
liability, and, in that sense, is not the reason the patient died. Explanatory causes do 
not exist in a vacuum – the investigation is raised in a particular climate of inquiry, 
and is purpose- and context-relative. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
that a person will act and on whether they failed to act, thus leading to a consequence that would not 
have eventuated had they acted. But that does not mean that the question is not about omissions at all – 
the two issues of responsibility and omission are logically interconnected. An analysis of what ‘cause’ 
means and its relationship to responsibility therefore cannot be bypassed, and I have attempted to 
provide that analysis here.  
49 R v Gibbins and Proctor (1918) 13 Cr App R 134. 
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The same analysis can be used to distinguish Gibbins and Proctor from Bland. Let us 
leave aside, for the moment, the question whether the Law Lords were correct to 
regard withdrawal in Bland as an omission rather than an act (see section 2(c)). Let us 
assume for present purposes the conduct is an omission.  What explains Anthony 
Bland’s death, at the time it actually occurs, is not the doctor’s refusal to provide any 
further life-sustaining measures, but rather the Law Lords’ decision that such a course 
of conduct would be lawful in the circumstances – a decision the doctor then goes on 
to implement. By contrast to Gibbins and Proctor, the declaration of lawfulness, and 
the decision that no duty would be imposed on the doctor to provide life sustaining 
measures, explains why Anthony is allowed to die when he does and is, in the 
explanatory sense, the cause of his death – the reason why he died when he did. But 
of course the lawful conduct itself meant that no further question of causation, from 
the point of view of establishing any liability for the conduct, could now arise. 
Therefore the omission consisting of the withdrawal of life-sustaining measures was 
not a cause in that explanatory sense. From the point of view of establishing what 
caused Anthony’s death for the purposes of assessing liability, it was the 
Hillsborough disaster and Anthony’s condition. Since omissions are not causes in any 
other sense, the doctor’s omission could not be regarded as the cause of Anthony’s 
death. For the same reason, the question of causation, in this explanatory sense, 
cannot be separated from the question of a duty, or from the lawfulness of the 
conduct, in spite of Lord Mustill’s and Thomas J’s50 claims to the contrary. The 
source of Lord Mustill’s and Thomas J’s confusion is that they think of omissions as 
negative acts, and therefore as having causal consequences regardless of whether 
                                                 
50 See the remark by Thomas J from Auckland Area Health Board v Attorney-General [1993] 1 NZLR 
235, at 249, cited above at note 17. 
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those casual consequences have explanatory force or not, just as acts do. For this 
reason, they think of the duty question as a separate question from the causal question. 
But in fact, omissions are not like acts at all, and only have causal consequences 
where the omission has explanatory power, that is, where the omission can be said to 
be the reason why a consequence eventuated. Typically, this is where I have a duty to 
act or where, at least, there is an expectation that I have left unfulfilled (my garden’s 
being overgrown is the result of my omission to tend to it, not my neighbour’s, 
because it is my responsibility, not my neighbour’s, to tend to it51).  
 
Turning, finally, to the interloper case and, assuming once again for the sake of 
argument that the conduct is to be classified as an omission not an act,52 it can be seen 
that there is no inconsistency between regarding the interloper as the cause of death in 
the case of the dying patient, but not regarding the doctor as the cause of death in 
identical circumstances. For what the law is concerned with is ‘cause’ in its 
explanatory sense, that is, what, out of a host of different conditions, things, and 
events, can be seen to be the salient reason why the patient died. And where there is a 
duty not to intervene – where the norm is that one would not fail in one’s duty – a 
failure in that context will be seen to be a salient reason why the patient died, and 
would therefore be regarded as the cause for legal purposes. By contrast, where there 
is no such duty – and where the norm is that one has no duty to provide the measures 
– then the law is not going to regard the conduct that is in accord with that duty as the 
cause, as that which renders intelligible, and hence explains, why death occurred. For 
                                                 
51 This example is from Hart and Honoré.  
52 I discuss the apparent inconsistency of regarding the conduct an omission in the case of a doctor but 
an act in the case of an interloper in the following section. 
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this reason, there is no inconsistency or contradiction in the law in the case of the 
conduct in the end of life context. 
 
We must now turn to one final obstacle to this account: the conduct concerned in 
Bland was not merely the withholding of treatment, but concerned its withdrawal. 
Could withdrawal be conceived as an act and so be causative in accordance with the 
paradigm notion of an agent acting on a substance?  
 
(c) Withdrawing as compared with withholding: an act or omission? 
 
It might be objected that, even if the above analysis were correct, it would only apply 
to withholding life-sustaining measures. In the case of withdrawing (as distinguished 
from withholding) those measures, surely, we do have an act, namely, the act of 
withdrawing? It seems as though the above analysis could not apply to withdrawal 
because it fits the prototype from which I have been attempting to distinguish the 
other notions.  
 
Much ink has been spilled on whether a doctor causes the patient’s death when 
withdrawing life-sustaining measures, or whether he merely reverses a prior decision 
to intervene in the natural course of events so that withdrawing the measures is simply 
a later decision, down the line, to withhold treatment. A particularly forceful objection 
to classifying withdrawal as an omission has been made by Susan Lowe, in the 
context of a discussion of the right to refuse treatment made by a competent patient. 
Lowe claims a request to have an artificial ventilator switched off should not be 
regarded as equivalent to refusing to be attached to it in the first place – once 
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attached, the doctor must do something to remove the patient from it.53 This point is 
correct as far as it goes, but the issue is not whether it should be regarded as 
equivalent to refusing it in the first place, but whether it should be regarded as 
equivalent to refusing it from this point forward. Lowe is committed to the position 
that, once the treatment has started, the opportunity to refuse it has passed. But all that 
has passed is the opportunity to refuse it from the beginning. It does not follow that 
the opportunity to refuse it from this point forward has also passed. Nonetheless, even 
if regarded as a refusal of further treatment, the fact that a doctor must now ‘switch 
off’ the ventilator still raises the issue of whether that doctor’s conduct should be 
regarded as an act or omission. The doctor now has to intervene to bring about the 
patient’s death. What is the status of withdrawal of life-sustaining measures? Is it an 
act or omission? 
 
It is essential to note at the outset that there is an ambiguity in the question ‘is 
withdrawal an act or omission?’ The question can either mean: 
 
1. Is the conduct in question an act or omission? Or 
2. Should the conduct in question be classified as an act or omission? Answering 
this second question involves answering whether either the category of 
omissions or the category of acts should be modified or extended so that, from 
this point forward, it is clear under which of the two categories the conduct in 
question falls. 
 
                                                 
53 Susan Lowe, above n 29, at 156. 
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The first question is raised where there are no genuine difficulties about how the 
conduct in question should be classified. For example, when we know that the given 
facts of a case concern a lethal injection, we know that the administration of a lethal 
injection is uncontroversially an act. Similarly, when the facts of the case concern 
withholding (rather than withdrawing) treatment, we know that withholding is 
uncontroversially an omission.54 Since the paradigm case of an omission is an 
abstention, and since withholding is an abstention, it is natural that withholding 
should be classified as an omission. It is therefore simply a question of applying the 
relevant concept to the conduct concerned – a straightforward task of slotting the 
conduct in question into one of two pre-existing and fixed categories. But, in addition 
to the standard or paradigm cases, are cases that fall nearer to the periphery. At the 
borderline, it is no longer determinate whether the conduct in question is an act or an 
omission. At this point, we are dealing with the second question, which involves 
moving the borderline so as to bring the indeterminate behaviour inside one or the 
other of the categories. In such a case, no further facts await discovery, and a decision 
must arguably55 be made as to which side of the line the conduct in question should be 
held to fall. Only when the line dividing these two categories is redrawn,56 can that 
newly fashioned category then be applied to determine the legal outcome on the facts.  
                                                 
54 Some think, of course, that withholding is nevertheless a species of euthanasia, but not on the basis 
that withholding is an act (though, as we saw above, some critics like Rachels and Glover may 
mistakenly construe omissions as negative acts.) 
55 I say ‘arguably’ here because, for reasons we shall come to in Section 2(d), the question of causation 
could be decided independently of the act/omission distinction.  
56 The Law Lords of course took themselves only to be making a declaration of lawfulness in the 
circumstances before them of Anthony Bland, and not to be changing the law – fresh declarations being 
required in future cases. However, this does not affect the point being made here, for in order to declare 
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The Law Lords in Bland were concerned with the second question, but they wrote the 
judgement, and critics have responded to it,57 as though they were answering the first 
– as though the arguments are merely about which of the two pre-existing and fixed 
categories the behaviour should be slotted into, rather than about the boundaries of 
those concepts themselves. They held that withdrawal, at least from an incompetent 
patient such as Anthony Bland, is an omission, and advanced reasoning appealing to 
factors which made the conduct in question similar to omissions. One argument to 
support the conclusion that the conduct is an omission is that a decision to withdraw 
the measures can reasonably be regarded as a decision, from this point forward, to 
withhold them, and withholding is incontestably an omission. The court found on this 
basis that withdrawal is an omission and is therefore a species of withholding, rather 
than a species of euthanasia. However, this argument is advanced even while 
expressly conceding the fact that the doctors must actually do something to stop 
providing the treatment. Consider, for example, Lord Goff’s reasoning in the 
following passage: 
                                                                                                                                            
the conduct lawful on that one occasion, the concept of omission was extended, for reasons we shall 
come to. Furthermore, the claim that the case simply declared the law as it currently stood and did not 
set a precedent is arguably naïve, as subsequent examples of withdrawal where declarations have not 
been sought, in spite of the ruling, have shown.  
57 See, in particular, Ashworth, who recognises that ‘although there are clear cases of omission and 
some clear cases of act, there are many ambiguous cases’, but who concluded that those ambiguous 
cases were being used as a cloak for avoiding the moral issues (Ashworth, above n 7, p 113). One way 
of dealing with the moral issues is precisely to clarify the law and remove the ambiguity at law. Where 
the case is genuinely borderline and reasonable minds can disagree, a decision may need to be made, 
and in that case it is more correct to say that shirking the need to make the decision is avoiding the 
moral (and legal) issues. 
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I agree that the doctor’s conduct in discontinuing life support can properly be characterised as 
an omission. It is true that it may be difficult to describe what the doctor actually does as an 
omission, for example, where he takes some positive step to bring the life support to an end. 
But discontinuation of life support is, for present purposes, no different from not initiating life 
support in the first place. In each case, the doctor is simply allowing his patient to die in the 
sense that he is desisting from taking a step which might, in certain circumstances, prevent his 
patient from dying as a result of his pre-existing condition.58 
 
The difficulty with the reasoning – a difficulty that is responsible for all the criticism 
that it has generated – is that Lord Goff appears to be slotting the conduct into the pre-
existing category of omissions, claiming that ‘the distinction appears…to be useful in 
the present context in that it can be invoked to explain how discontinuance of life 
support can be differentiated from ending a patient’s life by a lethal injection.’ 59 But 
at the same time, Lord Goff nevertheless acknowledges that the conduct does involve 
some positive step to bring the life support to an end. This leaves the passage open to 
the objection of how the fact that a positive step is needed can simply be ignored. 
Doesn’t that mean it is an act? How can he be justified in slotting the conduct into the 
existing category of omissions when he has just conceded that it also involves acts – 
invoking and using, of course, the very same distinction to make that point? This then 
gives rise to the charges of ‘dishonesty’, ‘sophistry’, and the like that have become the 
buzzwords in so much of the secondary literature since the judgement was handed 
                                                 
58 Airedale N H S Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 866 (italics added). 
59 Airedale N H S Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 866. 
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down, the charge being that these factors were conveniently ignored so as to secure 
the right outcome.60 
 
Similarly, Lord Lowry stated that he could not accept that there is a valid distinction 
between an omission to treat a patient (withholding), and the discontinuation of 
treatment commenced (withdrawal). If we accepted such a distinction, he held, we 
would illogically confer immunity on a doctor who had not embarked on treatment, 
but would refuse immunity to a doctor who had done so but who then decided to 
discontinue the treatment.61  This argument is a strong one which appeals to a real 
difficulty with classifying withdrawal as an act, but does it follow that withdrawal is 
not an act? Or is it the case that Lord Lowry’s argument is at bottom an argument that 
withdrawal should not be classified as an act, that is, that the concept of omissions 
should be extended to include withdrawals, even though withdrawals involve acts, so 
that the practical difficulty of conferring immunity on a doctor who withholds but not 
on a doctor who withdraws is avoided? Again, to anyone with a grasp of and ability to 
use our ordinary concepts of an act and an omission, it might seem as though Lord 
Lowry is forcing the conduct to fit within our ordinary omission category, thereby 
conveniently ignoring those aspects of the conduct that would resist that 
categorisation.  
 
                                                 
60 See e.g. D Price ‘Euthanasia, Pain Relief and Double Effect’ (1992) (17) 2 LS 323 at 340. Huxtable, 
above n 5, pp 119-120. 
61 Airedale N H S Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 875. 
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Lord Browne-Wilkinson, too, noted that, ‘withdrawal’ in this context was an 
omission.62 Aside from the act of moving the tube, the mere failure to continue doing 
what was previously done is not, ‘in any ordinary sense’, to do anything positive. This 
point, coupled with the use of ‘in any ordinary sense’, makes it look as though Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson is fitting the conduct in question within our ordinary existent 
category of omissions. However, in the case of removing the tube, he immediately 
acknowledges that positive acts are involved: 
 
The positive act of removing the tube presents more difficulty. It is undoubtedly a positive act, 
similar to switching off a ventilator.63   
 
Nevertheless, he insists that neither the case of removing the tube nor removing the 
ventilator ‘should be classified as positive, since to do so would be to introduce 
intolerably fine distinctions. Thus the positive act of removing the tube should not be 
classified as “positive”’.64 It should be classified instead as an omission. His 
reasoning for this conclusion is that removing the tube is not causally relevant 
because the tube itself does not sustain life, but only the food and water passed 
through it. Indeed, the tube could have been left in place and the doctors could simply 
refrain from providing any further nutrients through it – which is incontestably an 
                                                 
62 Airedale N H S Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 881. 
63 Airedale N H S Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 881 (italics added). 
64 Airedale N H S Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 882 (italics added). It may seem that Lord Browne-
Wilkinson is seeking only to deny that the conduct is positive, not that it is an act. However, he is 
actually seeking to deny that it is an act, as the following wording shows ‘even if, contrary to my view, 
the removal of the tube is to be classified as an act….’ (italics added) [1993] AC 789 at 882.  
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omission.65 The ‘act’, then, of removing the tube could not be construed as the 
positive act of removing the nutrition, but rather was incidental to the failure to 
continue providing the feeding and hydration, and failure to provide feeding a 
hydration is an omission, not an act.  
 
An obvious difficulty with Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s judgement here is that, if he is 
simply applying our ordinary category of acts and omissions, it is contradictory. For 
he states that the positive act of removing the tube, or switching off a ventilator, 
should not be classified as a positive act – but he’s used the very concept whose 
application he is denying to identify the conduct to which that concept should not 
apply! It is, in fact, only possible to understand Lord Browne-Wilkinson’s reasoning 
here if we understand him as extending, and then applying, the category of omissions, 
rather than simply applying the pre-existing one. If, on the contrary, it is seen as 
merely an application of the pre-existing category, it is open to the very objections 
that he himself acknowledges, as well as to the charge of contradiction. For again, if 
he concedes that removing the tube is a positive act, how can he at the same time state 
that it should be regarded as an omission? This only makes sense if he is 
recommending an extension of that category to include that conduct and to remove 
the uncertainty as to its legal classification. 
 
In the final analysis, as all these passages of reasoning show, there are good 
arguments for concluding both that the conduct should be characterised as an act and 
that it should be characterised as an omission. Reasonable minds can disagree as to 
which category the conduct belongs. The argument simply cannot be settled by 
                                                 
65 Airedale N H S Trust v Bland [1993] AC 789 at 882. 
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slotting the conduct into one of the pre-existent categories. But if the Law Lords are 
understood to be doing just that, then it is not surprising that it has generated so much 
criticism. For the very difficulties they acknowledge point the other way, and it looks 
as though they are acknowledging those difficulties only to ignore them – giving rise 
to all the charges of speciousness, inconsistency and of ‘warp[ing] the concepts of 
omission, duty, knowledge and causation’66 that have been raised, as well as to the 
charge of ‘concealing the reasons for the decision behind the act/omission 
distinction’67 and of using the distinction ‘to smuggle notions of justification in under 
the guise of being “omissions”’.68 
 
But notice that if they had decided that the conduct was therefore to be classified as an 
act, then the other considerations on which they relied in deciding it was an omission 
would then have been regarded as having been ignored by critics. Critics then would 
have protested that important similarities with withholding treatment and with 
omissions were being ignored. In reality, their Lordships were dealing with a genuine 
borderline case and therefore were dealing with conduct whose classification was 
indeterminate, with considerations either way. The question they were answering was 
not, then, how to apply the existing categories, but was a conceptual question about 
where the boundary between the categories of ‘act’ and ‘omission’ should lie. Any 
conceptual distinction has not fallen from the sky but is drawn relative to our 
purposes. Sometimes, particularly at law, those concepts need to be modified or the 
                                                 
66 Andrew Ashworth, above n 12, at 437. 
67 Ibid, at 437. See also Huxtable, above n 5, p 140, who cites this passage in support of his own 
argument for the same conclusion. 
68 Michael Moore, above n 6, p 27. 
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line dividing them needs to be redrawn. The only way the issues raised by Bland 
could be resolved was to make a decision which extends or narrows the categories to 
be applied, before applying them. Their Lordships were not therefore concealing the 
real reasons for the outcome of Bland behind the pre-existing concept of omission, 
conveniently ignoring the considerations that pointed the other way. Rather, they 
acknowledged those considerations and drew the line in a different place, setting a 
precedent as to what counts as an omission at law.69 Their finding was not that 
removal of the tube or switching off a ventilator ‘is’ an omission because the doctor 
refrains from doing anything. Rather, their finding was that removal of the tube or 
switching off a ventilator ‘should be classified as’ an omission because, even though 
acts are involved, what is being done through them is essentially to omit to feed or 
ventilate.  
 
Consequently, the legal concept of omissions has been broadened, and the correlative 
legal concept of acts has been narrowed. When writers continue to object to it, they 
mistakenly think that the existing category of omissions prior to the Bland decision 
has been applied, and they object to it using those existing categories, arguing that 
they have been misapplied, distorted or ‘warped’. Whereas the existing concept has 
been modified and then applied. In short, the endless debate about whether the 
conduct in question is an act or omission is solved by recognising that, in ordinary 
life, it has not been necessary to make a decision either way and so the facts in 
question fall at the borderline. As a matter of law, however, a decision is made which 
moves the borderline backwards or forwards, depending on how the issue is resolved 
                                                 
69 This is so notwithstanding that their Lordships considered themselves merely to be declaring the 
lawfulness of the conduct before them rather than changing the law. On this point, see above n 56.  
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in the case at hand – whether the concept is broadened or narrowed. In this case, the 
concept of omission was broadened, and the concept of act was narrowed. 
 
It might be objected that, even if this were so, the criticisms of writers who accuse the 
law of hiding behind the act/omission distinction remain valid, and could simply be 
reformulated in terms that take into account their Lordships’ extended application of 
these concepts, as follows: choosing to extend, and then apply, the category of 
omissions to include the conduct in Bland amounts to no more than the fictional 
device of deeming the conduct to be an omission, and this is a convenient way of 
smuggling notions of justification in under the guise of omissions, or amounts to 
‘warping’ the category to serve their purposes. Using the device of deeming is 
objectionable, because it evades the real questions and shrouds them under the 
obscurity of a distinction that in fact has no moral relevance.  
 
Several points are worthy of note in response to this objection. First, to say that the 
distinction has no moral relevance begs important questions. For arguments against its 
moral relevance are steeped precisely in presuppositions about the logical character of 
the distinction. For those who believe that omissions are negative acts, for example, it 
is easy to see how they might be driven to the conclusion that the distinction is not 
morally relevant.70 Similarly, Lord Mustill’s conclusions about the morally misshapen 
status of the law stem, as we have seen, from his belief that if some omissions have 
                                                 
70 James Rachels’ arguments for its moral irrelevance stem, as we have seen, from this error. It is in 
fact a common mistake for critics to concede that a logical distinction can be drawn, but dismiss that 
logical distinction as morally irrelevant. A logical distinction can also be drawn between murder and 
manslaughter, but it is precisely the considerations that ground the logical distinction that are also 
relevant morally.  
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causal consequences, then all must do so, and so from his view that omissions are not 
distinct from acts in this regard. In short, his view about the moral status of the law 
stems directly from his view about the intellectual status of it, as he himself implicitly 
acknowledges. Furthermore, alternative suggestions that the law should focus instead 
on notions of responsibility do, when pressed, risk reintroducing precisely the kinds of 
categorial distinctions that I have been discussing. For notions of causality inevitably 
intrude into questions of responsibility, both inside and outside the law (we do not, for 
example, hold people morally or legally responsible for harm they have not caused), 
and cannot so easily be avoided. A significant factor weighing heavily on all the 
judges in this case was the point that Anthony’s life was already being prolonged, and 
that, in substance, the issue was whether to continue prolonging his life, or whether 
his condition should be allowed to take full effect and he be allowed to die. 
Classifying the conduct as an omission brings out this important consideration, which 
arguably would have been obscured if the conduct had been classified as an act, for 
that would have concealed the distinction between the proposed conduct and 
euthanasia.71  
 
Second, even assuming that the word ‘deeming’ is appropriate here (on this point, see 
below), the point made still stands: where there is genuine indeterminacy as to which 
of two correlative terms (acts or omissions) apply to a given stretch of conduct, a 
decision is required, and that is precisely the role of the common law. The objection 
to such a procedure would only stand if it were really already clear which of the two 
                                                 
71 For more on the moral relevance of the distinction, see Andrew McGee, ‘Finding a Way through the 




terms really applied, but the court applied the other term (omissions) because of the 
unpalatable consequences of applying the correct one (acts). But as we have seen, the 
position is not clear cut and is one, on the contrary, over which reasonable minds may 
disagree and so is an appropriate case for this type of concept formation.  
 
Third, the word ‘deeming’ is a loaded term because, in one of its senses, it is regarded 
as a fictional device used to extend the meaning of a term whose scope is normally 
more restricted. Its use in this sense is typically in Statutes to extend the application of 
concepts to conduct or things that would otherwise not be caught by terms used in 
their everyday sense. For example:   
 
In this Act, ‘day old poultry’ shall be deemed to be any poultry of an age of seventy-two hours 
or less.72  
 
The use of deeming here as a fictional device in this sense necessarily presupposes 
that, outside of the law, the word being defined has a definite, but different, meaning. 
We know that a day is 24 hours, not 72 hours. However, the Law Lords in Bland were 
not using a fictional device and therefore were not ‘deeming’ acts to be omissions in 
this sense for, as we have seen, the conduct being considered was a genuine 
borderline case over which reasonable minds could disagree. The requisite contrast 
between two definite, but different, meanings was absent in that case. The use of the 
                                                 
72 Poultry Act 1968 (NZ), s 2. The example comes from D C Pearce and R S Geddes, Statutory 
Interpretation in Australia (Butterworths Australia, 5th edn, 2001) p. 116. 
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word ‘deeming’ to describe the decision of the Law Lords in Bland would therefore 
be misleading given the sense it has in the law of a statutory fiction.73 
 
It follows that this objection would only be valid if the reasons in favour of 
classifying the conduct as an act considerably outweigh the reasons for classifying it 
as an omission. Where, however, reasonable minds can genuinely disagree over the 
question, and where equally valid considerations point in favour of both conclusions, 
there is no reproach for solving the issue by means of concept formation – indeed, that 
is precisely what is required so as to put an end to the legal uncertainty. Distinctions 
are drawn by people, rather than found ready-made in nature, and they are drawn 
relative to our purposes of classification. It is therefore unsurprising that, at law, a 
distinction might be drawn in a way that removes an uncertainty. For the purposes of 
liability, it was necessary to draw the distinction74 in the way it was drawn precisely 
to remove that uncertainty.  
 
For these reasons, the objections we have identified cannot be reformulated in a valid 
way but should be rejected as based on a misunderstanding of what the Law Lords 
were actually doing.  
 
                                                 
73 I stop short of asserting that ‘deeming’ cannot be used to describe what the Law Lords were doing, 
for of course the word ‘deeming’ is itself flexible. I am merely recommending that it should not be 
used for the reasons given, for it is liable to invite misplaced objections to the decision.  
74 As we shall see, however, the decision could have been justified even if the conduct was classified as 
an act. The point to note here, though, is that classifying it as an act does not remove the arguments for 
classifying it as an omission. The arguments for both conclusions were cogent, which is why a 
conceptual decision had to be made. 
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For the sake of completeness, we will consider in the following section what the legal 
position would be even if the conduct had been classified as an act. Before turning to 
this question, however, we must deal with one final point relevant to whether the 
conduct is an act or an omission: Lord Goff regarded the conduct of an interloper as 
an act while regarding the conduct of the doctor as an omission. Although related, this 
is a different question from that of whether the conduct should be regarded as 
causative, because it is possible to hold that the conduct is an omission in both cases, 
but is only causative in the case of the interloper. Was Lord Goff, then, being 
inconsistent in regarding the conduct of the interloper as an act, rather than an 
omission? Should he not simply have regarded it as an omission that, unlike that of 
the doctor, was causative? 
 
Because, as we have just seen, the question of whether the conduct is an act or 
omission is indeterminate and required a conceptual decision on the part of the Law 
Lords, some of the arguments for holding that the conduct is an omission may not 
apply in the case of an interloper. If so, then Lord Goff could justify holding that the 
conduct should be classified differently in each case – it cannot simply be assumed 
that he is inconsistent on the ground that the interloper and the doctor are ‘doing the 
same thing’. This is precisely a circumstance where the ambiguity of this phrase – as 
we saw earlier, ‘doing the same thing’ is not necessarily equivalent in meaning with 
‘performing the same physical actions’ – can mask an important difference. In 
commenting on the interloper example, Lord Goff took to be relevant the different 
circumstance that the interloper is intervening in a regime of treatment provided by 
the doctor. The interloper is actively intervening to stop the doctor from prolonging 
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the patient’s life.75 For this reason, the conduct was sufficiently different from that 
engaged in by the doctor to warrant being called an act, rather than an omission. 
There is nothing inconsistent about his doing so. For he has cited relevant factors by 
means of which he has distinguished the interloper’s conduct from the doctor’s 
conduct. Critics would have to show that those factors are themselves irrelevant or 
immaterial to the question in order to sustain a charge of inconsistency.  
 
(d) If the conduct had been classified as an act, would the conduct have been 
causative? 
 
It should be noted that, even if the proposed doctor’s conduct in Bland had been 
characterised as an act, it does not follow that it would have been the cause at law. 
Causation must still be satisfied even where the paradigm notion in our ordinary 
discourse of an agent acting on a substance is concerned. What the court was doing, in 
holding that the withdrawal was not a cause, was stating that the withdrawal was not a 
salient feature, the reason, for the patient’s death. It expressed this point in the 
language of omission because it decided that withdrawal should be regarded as a 
species of withholding, and because it was no doubt anxious to ensure that the 
difference between the proposed conduct and euthanasia was not obscured. However, 
it was not compelled to do so. It could have regarded the withdrawal as an act, which 
nonetheless was not sufficiently causally connected with the consequence as to be 
regarded as a cause of it. In short, even the paradigm notion of cause as an effect 
produced by an agent acting on another substance does not mean that the cause is 
explanatorily significant, and, where it is not, the court can take the view that it 
                                                 
75 [1993] AC 789 at 866. 
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should not be regarded as a cause in law.76 The court would, of course, express this 
conclusion in the legal language established by precedent, as a cause that is not ‘an 
operating’ or ‘significant factor’ or as ‘too remote’, etc, but the use of that language 
can be translated into the notion I have been arguing for here, to mean that the cause 
is not explanatorily significant. A cause in law is thus always a question about 
whether the consequence has genuine explanatory force; is it a salient reason why the 
event it putatively caused really happened?  
 
What, then, if, instead of classifying the conduct as an omission, the court would have 
classified it as an act? We have seen that one of the reasons why the court decided to 
classify withdrawal as an omission, rather than as an act, is that the patient’s life was 
being prolonged. The court considered that withdrawal could therefore be construed 
as a decision not to (further) prolong the patient’s life, and this was, of course, the 
basis for concluding that the conduct should be regarded as a species of withholding 
treatment and therefore as an omission. In short, the doctor’s withdrawal of artificial 
feeding and hydration merely reverses the original decision, from this point forward, 
to prolong the patient’s life and prevent death from taking effect. Note how this point 
holds even if the conduct is classified as an act rather than as an omission. As I have 
                                                 
76 Thus explanatory causes are a broader genus of which agent causes and non-agent causes are species. 
It is certainly true that an agent cause is causative regardless of whether it is explanatorily significant, 
whereas an omission is, I have argued, only causative if it is explanatorily significant. However agent 
causes, too, are only causes at law if they are explanatorily significant for the purposes of establishing 
legal liability. And omissions only have causal consequences where the conduct omitted is expected to 
occur, so that its non-occurrence is a reason for why a consequence that would not normally eventuate 
actually eventuated on this occasion (hence, the food went stale because he forgot to put it back in the 
fridge, etc). 
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noted elsewhere,77 both withholding and withdrawing – even when the conduct is 
construed as a causative omission or as an act and conducted by an interloper or 
layperson – can be distinguished from euthanasia, at least in the following sense: life 
sustaining measures prolong life, that is, they postpone or defer death by preventing 
the consequences of the patient’s underlying condition from taking effect. Euthanasia, 
by contrast, cuts short a life that would otherwise go on without the need for any life-
sustaining measures. Thus even if withdrawal were classified as an act, it would 
nevertheless remain distinct from euthanasia to the extent that the life in question 
were no longer being artificially prolonged. What implications does this have for the 
question of causation? 
 
It is noteworthy that regardless of whether withholding or withdrawing nutrition is 
conducted by an interloper or greedy son, or by a doctor, there is nevertheless a 
distinction – morally relevant or not – between stopping the prolongation of 
someone’s life, on the one hand, and cutting short a life that is not being prolonged, 
on the other. Even if we regard the greedy son or interloper as guilty of murder, they 
have not cut short the life of someone who would have lived on unaided. They have 
merely stopped his or her life being prolonged. However, it would be wrong to 
conclude that they have ‘allowed the patient to die’ if this expression means 
something other than ‘killing’ the patient. The very considerations Lord Goff 
appealed to in deciding to classify the conduct of an interloper as an act, and the 
conduct of the doctor as an omission, apply here. And the reason for this is that the 
interloper’s conduct becomes explanatorily relevant. For just as a layperson is not 
qualified to write a prescription, so an interloper or greedy son is not qualified to 
                                                 
77 Andrew McGee, above n 71. 
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‘allow a patient to die’. Instead, they intervene in the process of prolonging life in an 
unauthorised way and, for the reasons we have already seen, such conduct cannot be 
classified as ‘doing the same thing’ as the doctor does, even if they both ‘perform the 
same physical actions’. Although there is a clear distinction between letting die and 
killing, as we have seen, it does not follow that the interloper and greedy son ‘let the 
patient die’ – even if the result of their conduct is that the patient’s life is no longer 
being prolonged. Because the interloper and greedy son are unauthorised to engage in 
the conduct in question, they are under a duty not to intervene in the way that they do. 
For this reason, even if the conduct in their case were classified as an omission, they 
would have murdered by omission. Likewise if their conduct were classified as an act 




If the analyses in this paper are correct, a number of the common criticisms of the law 
in this area are misconceived. Unfortunately, it has become commonplace for writers 
in this field to deride the law in this area as being confused, inconsistent and, in some 
cases, an expression of intellectual and moral dishonesty. These criticisms are strong 
and, in light of the potential seriousness of these criticisms, and the increasing calls 
for reform which have been based on them, they called for fresh scrutiny. As I have 
attempted to show, the inconsistencies and confusions are, in fact, in many cases the 
authors’ own, and the charges of intellectual and moral dishonesty are without 
foundation. Calls for compromise, for a complete overhaul of the law and a ‘more 
principled’ approach, to the extent that such calls are themselves based on confusion 
about the categories of causation, act and omission, are premature and need to be 
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reconsidered. The law is not intellectually and morally misshapen. This famous 
comment from Lord Mustill, which has been taken up by others, has been shown to 
rest on a misunderstanding of the nature of causation and of the logical relationship 
between causation and the existence of legal duties as norms of conduct. It is hoped 
that the clarification of these concepts in this paper has opened the way for more 
fruitful and constructive debate about the important issues of lawful withdrawal, 
refusal, assisted dying and euthanasia. 
